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I. VOLUNTARY ASSUMPTION OF THE RISK
AND CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
In recent years considerable attention has been given to the defenses of
voluntary assumption of the risk and contributory negligence, primarily due
to the considerable alterations which these defenses have undergone.' Much
confusion has resulted from the fact that these two defenses are based upon
entirely different considerations. Voluntary assumption of the risk, if
recognized as a separate defense, is basically a consent doctrine, whereas the
defense of contributory negligence is essentially a fault doctrine. 2  In the
former the injured person is barred from recovery because of his "willingness
to take a chance" under circumstances where an alternative course of action
was available. In the latter the injured person's recovery is barred or
diminished because his conduct was unreasonably dangerous. The Supreme
Court of Texas has clarified this distinction in recent years,3 thereby making
it easier to deal with the fundamental policy questions relating to the type of
conduct that should bar or diminish the plaintiff's recovery.
In last year's Survey considerable discussion was devoted to the subject of
voluntary assumption of the risk. 4 At that time the defense was recognized
by the Texas Supreme Court regardless of whether the plaintiff's theory of
recovery was one of negligence or strict liability. In reporting on the cases
in last year's Survey, my thesis was that with respect to recovery on a
negligence theory the defense of voluntary assumption of risk should general-
ly be inapplicable except where (a) prior to encountering the danger, the
plaintiff and defendant entered into an express or implied in fact agreement
that defendant would not be legally responsible, or (b) the relationship
between the parties was such that defendant's duty of care was justifiably
limited to advising the plaintiff of the risk that was willingly encountered.5
My observations on assumed risk were concluded with the following state-
ment: "It is hardly necessary for me to say, in view of the observations that
* B.A., LL.B., University of Texas; S.J.D., Harvard University; LL.D., Southern
Methodist University. W. Page Keeton Professor of Law in Torts, University of Texas.
1. Keeton, Torts, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 29 Sw. L.J. 1-9 (1975); Keeton,
Torts, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28 Sw. L.J. 1, 15 (1974); Keeton, Torts, Annual
Survey of Texas Law, 26 Sw. L.J. 1, 10-13 (1972); Keeton, Torts, Annual Survey of
Texas Law, 24 Sw. L.J. 1, 3-8 (1970).
2. Bohlen, Voluntary Assumption of the Risk, 20 HARv. L. REV. 14 (1906);
Keeton, Assumption of Risk and the Landowner, 22 LA. L. REv. 108 (1961); Mansfield,
Informed Choice in the Law of Torts, 22 LA. L. REV. 17 (1961).
3. Henderson v. Ford Motor Co., 519 S.W.2d 87 (Tex. 1974), noted in 29 Sw. L.J.
644 (1975); Marshall v. Ranne, 511 S.W.2d 255 (Tex. 1974); Rabb v. Coleman, 469
S.W.2d 384 (Tex. 1971).
4. Keeton, Torts, Annual Survey oj Texas Law, 29 Sw. L.J. 1-9 (1975).
5. Id.
have been made above, that such defenses as are recognized in the products
liability area should be based on some kind of fault."6  This statement was
made in criticizing the holding in Henderson v. Ford Motor Co.7 that the
voluntary assumption of the risk defense is available when the basis for
recovery is strict liability.
In early 1975 the supreme court indicated that it was contemplating
changing the law with respect to voluntary assumption of the risk in
negligence actions. In Rosas v. Buddies Food Stores suit was brought
against a grocery store for injuries sustained when plaintiff slipped on a wet
floor in defendant's store. The trial court granted defendant's motion for
summary judgment, and the court of civil appeals affirmed, holding, first,
that there was no negligence as a matter of law since a wet floor was a
normal consequence of a rainy day. Second, the court determined that there
could be no breach of duty because the dangerous condition was, as a matter
of law, open and obvious. 9
The supreme court, in an opinion by Justice Steakley, remanded as to
both holdings, stating:
The writer, joined by Justices Daniel and Johnson would also declare
that for this trial, and henceforth in the trial of all actions based on
negligence, volenti non fit injuria-he who consents cannot receive an
injury-or, as is generally known, voluntary assumption of risk will no
longer be treated as an issue in actions based on negligence; but that
the reasonableness of an actor's conduct in confronting a risk will be
determined under principles of contributory negligence. 10
The court noted that elusive and complex distinctions inherent in this defense
were unduly complicating cases." Attention was also directed to the recent
adoption of comparative negligence.12  The court reasoned that if fault is
not a complete bar to recovery, then a plaintiff's willingness to encounter a
danger should not defeat a claim for relief except in rare circumstances.
Several other justices, while not disagreeing in principle, preferred to resolve
the issue in a case that involved the defense.' 3  Just such a case was
accepted by the court later in the year.
In Farley v. M M Cattle Co.' 4 the plaintiff was injured when the horse
he was riding collided with a horse ridden by a co-worker while they were
rounding up cattle for the defendant. At the conclusion of the plaintiff's
6. Id. at 8.
7. 519 S.W.2d 87 (Tex. 1974).
8. 518 S.W.2d 534 (Tex. 1975).
9. 509 S.W.2d 451 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1974), rev'd, 518 S.W.2d 534
(Tex. 1975).
10. 518 S.W.2d at 538.
11. See, e.g., Sifford v. Santa Rosa Medical Center, 524 S.W.2d 559 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1975, no writ). As this case and other cases demonstrate, the
recognition of this defense results in the creation of a number of critical issues. For
example, when is a person to be charged with knowledge of a condition and the
appreciation of the risk as a matter of law? What degree of the total danger must the
person appreciate? When is the person's decision to encounter a danger to be regarded
as involuntary?
12. TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a, § 1 (Supp. 1975-76).
13. Rosas v. Buddies Food Store, 518 S.W.2d 534, 540 (Tex. 1975).
14. 529 S.W.2d 751 (Tex. 1975).
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evidence, the trial court entered judgment for the defendant. This directed
verdict was upheld by the court of civil appeals. The supreme court ruled
that the plaintiff's evidence was sufficient to raise fact issues as to the
negligence of the defendant given the known danger of the horse. The
defendant cattle company argued that the plaintiff had assumed this risk as a
matter of law due to his appreciation of the unsuitability of the horse for the
task at hand. For the reasons previously set forth in Rosas, the court
rejected defendant's argument and abolished voluntary assumption of the
risk as a general defense in an action predicated on negligence. In addition
to the precise pronouncement set forth in the Rosas decision, the court added
two qualifying statements: "Unaffected will be the current status of the
defense in strict liability cases and cases in which there is a knowing and
express oral or written consent to the dangerous activity or condition. The
reasons expressed for abolishing the defense in negligence cases do not obtain
as to these situations.' 5
Justice Reavley, dissenting on another ground, stated that in negligence
cases he would regard volenti considerations as bearing upon the legal
determination of duty. 16 This seems to indicate that, notwithstanding the
abrogation of assumed risk as a general affirmative defense, there are
occasions when the defendant can satisfy a duty of care owed to another by
advising the latter of latent risks and dangers. Further, by abolishing
voluntary assumption of the risk as a general defense to recovery on a
negligence theory, the court has adopted the minority position which was
rejected some fifteen years ago by the American Law Institute.' 7  This
dubious consent doctrine has lost some of its adherents in recent years, 18 and
the assumption of risk defense is likely to be abrogated throughout the
country over the next ten to fifteen years.
The court's exceptions to the general proposition that an injured person's
willingness to take a reasonable chance will no longer constitute a complete
bar to recovery are extremely important. First, the court stated that no
change was intended in situations where "there is a knowing and express oral
or written consent to the dangerous activity or condition." 19 This obviously
means that an actual agreement to assume the risk will not necessarily be
invalid. And although the court speaks of an express agreement, perhaps an
implied-in-fact agreement will be treated in the same manner. Whether or
not such an agreement is enforceable will depend upon the relationship
between the parties, their respective bargaining positions, and perhaps other
policy considerations. 20
15. Id. at 758.
16. Id. at 760 (Reavley, J., dissenting).
17. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs 71 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1963); see Halepeska
v. Callihan Interests, Inc., 371 S.W.2d 368, 378 (1963).
18. See, e.g., Williamson v. Smith, 83 N.M. 336, 491 P.2d 1147 (1971); Siragusa v.
Swedish Hosp., 60 Wash. 2d 310, 373 P.2d 767 (1962); McConville v. State Farm Mut.
Auto Ins. Co., 15 Wis. 2d 374, 113 N.W.2d 14 (1962), and other cases cited in Rosas v.
Buddies Food Store, 518 S.W.2d 534 (Tex. 1975).
19. 529 S.W.2d at 758.
20. See Keeton, supra note 4, at 2-3. See also 6A A. CORBIN, CONTRACrs § 1472(1962); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 574, 575 (1932).
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Second, as previously noted, Justice Reavley in his brief opinion did not
rule out altogether the importance of a plaintiff's willingness to take a chance
as bearing upon the extent of a defendant's duty of care. This could
conceivably result in shifting the burden of pleading and proof to the
plaintiff, with the substantive policy position remaining the same as before.
Thus, if the duty of care of an occupier of land was satisfied by notifying an
invitee of dangers that were not open and obvious as a matter of law, then
no real change would have been effected. A reasonable interpretation of
the court's opinion would indicate, however, that only in exceptional circum-
stances should a defendant's duty be limited to giving notice of unappreciat-
ed dangers. 21
Finally, the court asserted that the law with respect to the assumed risk
defense in strict liability cases, or at least in products liability litigation, was
unaffected. This being true, the proposition in Henderson v. Ford Motor
Co.,22 that voluntary assumption of the risk is a complete bar to recovery,
remains intact when recovery based upon strict liability is sought against a
manufacturer, seller, or lessor. The court's justification for this novel
differentiation between negligence and strict liability is that the reasons
expressed for abolishing the defense in negligence cases are simply inapplica-
ble to strict liability actions. 23  However, the elusive and complex distinc-
tions and issues pertaining to this defense are no different when the theory of
recovery is strict liability. Further, the impetus for abolishing assumed risk
in negligence cases was the legislature's enactment of the comparative
negligence statute and the resulting abrogation of contributory negligence as
a complete bar to recovery. The thought was that if contributory negligence
were no longer a bar, then one's willingness voluntarily to take a reasonable
chance in encountering an appreciated danger should not prevent recovery.
Most courts, the Texas Supreme Court included, have of their own motion
abrogated contributory negligence as a bar to recovery in products liability
suits. 24 In fact, such conduct does not even diminish recovery. In light of
this, it could be concluded that the court's fear of the greater scope of
responsibility inherent in strict liability dictated the retention of at least some
defenses.
21. Most courts hold that an occupier of land can satisfy any duty of care owed to a
licensee by giving notice of dangers that would not likely be noticed by the casual
observer. This rule has not necessarily been altered. See, e.g., Deacy v. McDonnell,
131 Conn. 101, 38 A.2d 181 (1944); John v. Reich-McJunkin Dairy Co., 281 Pa. 543,
127 A. 143 (1924); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 342 (1965) [hereinafter cited
as RESTATEMENT (SECOND)].
22. 519 S.W.2d 87 (Tex. 1974).
23. 529 S.W.2d at 758.
24. Henderson v. Ford Motor Co., 519 S.W.2d 87 (Tex. 1974); see RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) § 402A, comment n at 356, which provides:
Since the liability with which this Section deals is not based upon the
negligence of the seller, but is strict liability, the rule applied to strict
liability cases (see § 524) applies. Contributory negligence of the plain-
tiff is not a defense when such negligence consists merely in a failure to
discover the defect in the product, or to guard against the possibility of
its existence. On the other hand the form of contributory negligence
which consists in voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a
known danger, and commonly passes under the name of assumption of
risk, is a defense under this Section as in other cases of strict liability.
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A more justifiable defense to any theory of recovery, fault or non-fault,
would seem to be the fault of the victim rather than his voluntary election to
take a reasonable chance in encountering danger. Most courts have, for
example, recognized as defenses both abnormal use, and voluntary and
unreasonable use after knowledge of a dangerous defect. 25 These are two
kinds of contributory negligence. Therefore, a rule that would diminish the
recovery of a contributorily negligent plaintiff against a seller through the
apportionment of blame between the seller and others legally responsible
would not seem unreasonable at this juncture.
,It is particularly unfortunate that the defendant should have a defense to
recovery on a strict liability theory (contributory negligence under compara-
tive negligence) which is unavailable on a negligence theory, and then, on
the other hand, have a defense to recovery on a negligence theory (assumed
risk) that is not available on a strict liability theory. Efficiency and justice
dictate the development of an exclusive theory of recovery in order to avoid
the now existing complicacy attendant in the submission to the jury of a case
premised on three theories-negligence, warranty, and strict liability in tort.
II. PRODUCTS LIABILITY
In the area of products liability Rourke v. Garza26 was perhaps the most
significant decision during the survey period. In Garza the defendant,
engaged in the business of leasing scaffolding materials, supplied as a bailor
the necessary component parts for the erection of a scaffold. The materials,
including the steel pipe frames, boards, and connecting pins, were delivered
at the job site, and checked in by the contractor's superintendent. The
superintendent signed a receipt which contained an indemnity provision on
the reverse side, and the scaffold was subsequently erected by Har-Con, the
contractor. Plaintiff, a pipefitter-welder and an employee of the contractor,
was seriously injured in a fall through the center of the scaffolding which
resulted when two of the boards "slipped on the inside." In response to
questions submitted, the jury found that: (1) The failure to have cleat-type
devices on the scaffold boards to prevent slippage rendered the scaffold
boards defective in the sense that the boards were dangerous to an extent
beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary user who leased it
with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteris-
tics; (2) the defendant could reasonably have anticipated that the boards
might be placed upon the scaffold frame without the addition of cleat-type
devices; (3) the defendant was not negligent in failing to provide cleat-type
devices on the scaffolding boards; and (4) the failure to have the cleat-type
devices on the board was a producing cause of the occurrence.
The court held that plaintiff himself was not chargeable with knowledge of
the absence of the cleats and the danger involved in their absence; moreover,
25. Green v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 485 F.2d 430 (6th Cir. 1973); Shields v.
Morton Chem. Co., 95 Idaho 674, 518 P.2d 857 (1974); Lewis v. Stran Steel Corp., 57
I11. 2d 94, 311 N.E.2d 128 (1974); Early-Gray, Inc. v. Walters, 294 So. 2d 181 (Miss.
1974).26. 530 S.W.2d 794 (Tex. 1975).
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the jury failed to find that plaintiff had knowledge of the absence of the
cleats prior to the accident. Affirming a trial court judgment for the
plaintiff, the supreme court in a six-to-three decision adopted several posi-
tions on issues relating to products liability that had not previously been
settled. These positions will be dealt with separately, but before doing so,
some general observations must be made concerning strict liability claims by
employees against sellers and suppliers of products and equipment.
Strict liability notions were developed primarily because of a feeling that
the negligence cause of action afforded inadequate protection for the general
consumer.27  Once adopted, the theory was extended so as to impose strict
liability upon manufacturers and sellers of all kinds of products, and to pro-
vide a remedy for all persons likely to be injured, often without much justifi-
cation for so doing.28 While I do not have a solution, it is apparent that in
many cases sellers and suppliers are being held responsible for harm to em-
ployees when the employer is far more to blame for the damaging event than
the supplier.
Lessors. In Garza the court held that those engaged in the business of
leasing products or equipment are subject to strict liability in the same way
as are manufacturers and sellers of products. 29 This result is not particular-
ly novel, as some courts have extended liability to large enterpriser-lessors of
cars and trucks. 30  What is significant is that it was apparently argued in
Garza that such a rule should not apply when the lessee is an industrial
purchaser in a position to demand the safest equipment available. However,
courts have not distinguished between sales to consumers generally and sales
to industrial purchasers, even when the only risk is to employees covered by
a no-fault compensation system.31  This presents a rather anomalous situa-
tion, in that the employee is covered by two no-fault systems, the less
adequate being the recovery available against the employer.
Perhaps there is little, if any, reason to differentiate between lessors and
retailers. Under section 402A of the Restatement (Second) no differentia-
tion is made between retailers and wholesalers on the one hand and manufac-
turers on the other.32 The justification for this is questionable, in that while
27. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods. Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 67, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697 (1963); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69
(1960); see Keeton, Products Liability-Liability Without Fault and the Requirement of
a Defect, 41 TEXAS L. REV. 855 (1963).
28. Lewis v. Stran Steel Corp., 57 II. 2d 94, 311 N.E.2d 128 (1974) (forklift
machine injuring an employee); Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432,
191 N.E.2d 81, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963) (airplane intended for airline use).
29. 530 S.W.2d at 800.
30. The two leading cases cited by the supreme court in Garza are: Cintrone v.
Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965); Stang v. Hertz
Corp., 83 N.M. 730, 497 P.2d 732 (1972). See also McClaflin v. Bayshore Equip.
Rental Co., 274 Cal. App. 2d 446, 79 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1969).
31. Stevens v. Kanematsu-Gosho Co., 494 F.2d 367 (1st Cir. 1974). Lewis v. Stran
Steel Corp., 57 Ill. 2d 94, 311 N.E.2d 128 (1974); Reese v. Chicago, B & Q.R.R., 55 I11.
2d 356, 303 N.E.2d 382 (1973).
32. Under § 402A strict liability applies to any seller if "the seller is engaged in the
business of selling such a product." The comment states "that public policy demands
that the burden of accidental injuries caused by products intended for consumption be
placed upon those who market them, and be treated as a cost of production against which
liability insurance can be obtained." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 402A, comment c at
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this imposition of strict liability on lessors and retailers for defective products
is not overly burdensome because of their ability to recover over against the
manufacturer, 3 these concerns are generally less able to distribute the risk
among the public at large. -It was for this reason that privity of contract was
eliminated as an impediment to recovery based on strict tort liability.
Moreover, as long as negligence continues as a prerequisite to recovery
against a retailer for harm resulting from a dangerous condition existing on
the premises, little explanation can be given for subjecting the retailer to
strict liability for harm resulting from a defect in a product, such as a bottle,
if the defect cannot be found to have originated with the manufacturer of the
bottle. If enterprise liability can be justified regarding product defects
originating with the retailer or other supplier, then perhaps it is equally
applicable to mishaps attributable to dangerous conditions.
Frequently, in connection with the sale and distribution of products,
especially petroleum products, the seller will lease to the purchaser equip-
ment with which to receive and store products. Notwithstanding Garza, it is
likely to be held that strict liability does not apply to harm from defects in
the leased equipment where the leasing is incidental to the sale of the
products.3 4 The justification for this distinction, though somewhat unpersua-
sive, is that such a leasing transaction is merely occasional in the conduct of
the enterpriser's business, and, therefore, it would be both unfair and overly
burdensome to subject him to a high standard of care.
Open and Obvious Danger. The courts are presently divided on the issue of
whether a product can be regarded as defective and unreasonably dangerous
when the danger stemming from the product's design is obvious to the casual
observer.3 5  Some courts have held that it is the duty of the ultimate
purchaser, especially industrial or other sophisticated enterpriser-purchasers,
to avoid the obvious dangers resulting from defectively designed products.36
Often these purchasers can, after acquiring the products, adopt measures,
make alterations, or install safety devices more economically than the
manufacturer. However, this argument is generally inapplicable to consum-
er products, for it is likely that measures necessary to reduce the risk would
350. The italics are mine and are for the purpose of showing that it was assumed that
retailers would be able to recover over against manufacturers. This could apply to
defects attributable to the manufacturing process.
33. Tromza v. Tecumseh Prods. Co., 378 F.2d 601 (3d Cir. 1967); Hager v. Brewer
Equip. Co., 17 N.C. App. 489, 195 S.E.2d 54 (1973).
34. See Freitas v. Twin City Fisherman's Coop. Ass'n, 452 S.W.2d 931 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Corpus Christi 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Keeton, Torts, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 25 Sw. L.J. 1, 3-4 (1971). But see Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 466 P.2d
722, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1970).
35. Schemel v. General Motors Corp., 384 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1967) (no liability);
Pike v. Hough Co., 2 Cal. 3d 465, 467 P.2d 229, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1970) (liability);
Wright v. Massey-Harris, Inc., 68 111. App. 2d 70, 215 N.E.2d 465 (1966) (liability);
Balm v. Triumph Corp., 33 N.Y.2d 644, 305 N.E.2d 769, 350 N.Y.S.2d 644 (1973) (no
liability); Campo v. Scofield, 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802, 95 N.Y.S.2d 610 (1950) (no
liability); Palmer v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 3 Wash. App. 508, 476 P.2d 713 (1970) (no
liability).
36. Schemel v. General Motors Corp., 384 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1967); Balm v.
Triumph Corp., 33 N.Y.2d 644, 305 N.E.2d 769, 350 N.Y.S.2d 644 (1973); Campo v.
Scofield, 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802, 95 N.Y.S.2d 610 (1950).
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be unavailable. Moreover, most consumers fail to appreciate the so-called
obvious dangers. Even so, some economists would argue that the best
mechanism for resolving the issue of how safely products should be designed,
particularly with reference to obvious dangers, is the market place.3 7 This
argument, for reasons already stated, is perhaps even more persuasive when
the product is intended for industrial and commercial use.
The Texas Supreme Court has adopted the position that a product can be
defective even though the risk or hazard is obvious. Under this view the
obviousness of the hazard is simply a factor bearing upon the ultimate issue
of whether the product is unreasonably dangerous."' This is the position I
have consistently supported, particularly with respect to sales to the general
consumer.
9
The hazard in.Garza was obvious to any casual observer, and the absence
of cleats on the planks should have been noticed when delivery was
accepted. Many courts, adopting a statement made in a comment to section
402A of the Restatement (Second), have said that a product is defective if it
is "dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the
ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common
to the community as to its characteristics."4 0 I have always construed this
to mean that an obvious hazard could not be regarded as a defect, and have
for this and other reasons rejected the "contemplation" test as invalid. In
submitting the issue of defectiveness to the jury in Garza, the trial judge
instructed that the boards were defective if they were more dangerous than
would be "contemplated by the ordinary user who leases" them. The jury
found that the boards were defective, possibly by construing the charge as
referring to the boards after the scaffold was assembled. Additionally, the
jury perhaps interpreted the term "user" as referring to Garza, the actual
user, rather than the lessee. If so, this interpretation did not present the
issue of defectiveness, but rather the issue of whether Garza assumed the risk
by using the scaffold. 41  The court held that "the jury was justified in
concluding that the risk of harm outweighed the utility of the cleatless
scaffold boards and that they were therefore unreasonably dangerous."'42
The jury was not asked to weigh danger against utility, but was simply to
consider whether the danger was greater than that which would be contem-
37. See Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation and Liability Rules-A
Comment, 11 J. LAW & ECON. 67 (1968); Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW
& ECON. 1 (1960).
38. Rourke v. Garza, 530 S.W.2d 794, 800 (Tex. 1975).
39. Keeton, Products Liability-Inadequacy of Information, 48 TExAs L. REv. 398,
400 (1970). It was there said:
The obviousness of a danger is quite relevant to the issue whether the
dangerous condition is unreasonably so-whether it subjects the user and
others in the vicinity of use to an unreasonable risk of harm. It is rele-
vant because the nature of the use of the product can be altered in light
of its known dangers. It is also, of course, relevant to the issue
whether the user was himself negligent in the way in which he used the
product on the occasion of the accident. It should not, however, be con-
clusive on either issue.
40. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) § 402A, comment i at 352 (emphasis added).
41. Henderson v. Ford Motor Co., 519 S.W.2d 87 (Tex. 1974).
42. 530 S.W.2d at 799.
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plated by the ordinary user. It therefore appears that the jury utilized a test
different from that employed by the supreme court in affirming the decision.
Suppliers of Component Parts. The supreme court in Garza apparently held
that a lessor who supplies component parts to an industrial lessee, knowing
that the parts are to be assembled, will incur the same liability as a lessor
who delivers an assembled product. 4-1 This is the most debatable aspect of
the decision. Perhaps it can be said that the cleatless scaffold boards were
unreasonably dangerous and that the supplier had a duty to furnish the
cleats for the scaffold. However, it does not follow in all cases that one who
sells or supplies component parts with the knowledge that they will be
assembled in a manner that subjects users to an unreasonable risk should be
expected to perceive the danger and guard against it. In such a transaction,
the supplier should be under no duty to foresee improper assembly by the
purchaser. In this regard the courts have concurred, as evidenced by their
considerable reluctance to subject manufacturers of component parts to strict
liability, even when the component part itself proves to be defective.4 4  In
Garza, however, the responsibility imposed extends far beyond defects in the
component parts. First, it extends to a lessor rather than a manufacturer,
and second, the liability extends to a danger that is obvious to the lessee.
Justice Daniel, dissenting, asks the pertinent question, "What if Har-Con had
specifically stated in its order that it wanted scaffold boards without cleats?
Would Rourke Rental then be liable . . . under the doctrine of strict
liability . . . ?,,45 Justice Daniel answered in the negative. It seems to me
that strict liability should not be applied at all against a supplier; certainly, it
should not be applied under the circumstances outlined by Justice Daniel.
Aside from industrial accidents, it would seem that the primary responsi-
bility should be borne by the assembler rather than the manufacturer of the
individual parts, for it is at the assembly stage that quality control can best
be employed to correct defective design with respect to the assembled
product. However, the limited recovery available to an employee against an
employer is clearly insufficient to provide the impetus needed to obtain
proper quality control in working conditions. Perhaps the Garza decision
will generate such impetus.
Negligence and Strict Liability. In Garza the jury finding that the defendant
43. "Neither can we agree that Rourke Rental is not responsible for this accident
because the scaffold was erected by Har-Con's employees . . . . Since the boards were
expected to and did reach the user, Garza, without substantial change in condition,
Rourke Rental may be held strictly liable." Id. at 801.
44. In Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 435, 191 N.E.2d 81,
83, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592, 595 (1963), the court refused "for the present at least" to hold the
manufacturer of a component part strictly liable. However, in Clark v. Bendix Corp., 42
App. Div. 2d 727, 728, 345 N.Y.S.2d 662, 664 (1973), an intermediate appellate court
reversed a trial court's dismissal of an action and remanded, stating that "if ...the
realities of the market place called for allowing a non-user to recover against the
manufacturer of the completed product for breach of warranty, a fortiori, those realities
should permit a purchaser and user to have similar recourse against the manufacturer of
the specific component allegedly responsible for the accident." The American Law
Institute purportedly expressed no opinion on the matter but in fact actually did. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 402A, comment q.
45. 530 S.W.2d at 806 (Daniel, J., dissenting).
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was not negligent raises the question of whether such finding can be
reconciled with a finding of defect, assuming that the risk was one that was
known to the supplier. Some courts have held that in order to resolve issues
involving defective product design, it is necessary to balance danger against
utility. This balancing approach has led to the conclusion that, except as to
certain defenses and, perhaps, proximate cause, there is essentially no
difference between negligence and strict liability as a basis for recovery.46
This conclusion is fallacious. It is that danger which the defendant did or
should have perceived which is balanced against utility in a negligence
inquiry, whereas it is the danger in fact which should be balanced against
utility to determine whether a product is defective. 47 It is true, however,
that normally there is no difference between the theories of negligence and
strict liability when the magnitude of the risk is actually perceived by the
seller, except where courts have created obstacles to recovery on a negli-
gence theory through the adoption of no-duty rules, proximate cause rules,
and defenses that need not necessarily be carried over to the new strict
liability compensation system. But as can be seen, this exception is expan-
sive.
The rule that an occupier's duty of care to an employee is satisfied by
warning the employer of a danger is, in effect, a no-duty rule, in that it often
relieves the defendant of legal responsibility when a jury could reasonably
find that the defendant was negligent in failing to take greater precautions. 48
This and other no-duty rules can be freely disregarded by courts in the
imposition of strict liability.
-If, in Garza, the jury was correct in finding no negligence, the conclusion
that the boards were defective becomes difficult to rationalize. If, however,
the supplier of the materials is to be treated as though he supplied the
scaffold as constructed, it would seem that a finding of no negligence is
consistent with a finding that the product was defective. This result follows
because a reasonable supplier might not have perceived the magnitude of the
danger, or because a reasonable person might not be expected to question
the lessee's judgment regarding proper safety practices. In any event, the
proper test to determine defectiveness of a product as marketed is whether a
reasonable person would conclude that the danger, as it is proved to be at
the trial, in fact outweighs its utility when used as intended, or perhaps, as it
was likely to be used.
III. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
As was predicted in the 1968 Survey, a variety of problems has accom-
panied the increase in professional malpractice litigation.4 9 In particular, a
46. Chestnut v. Ford Motor Co., 445 F.2d 967, 968-69 (4th Cir. 1971); Dyson v.
General Motors Corp., 298 F. Supp. 1064 (E.D. Pa. 1969). See also Wade, The
Continuing Development of Strict Liability in Tort, 22 ARK. L. REV. 233, 234 (1968).
47. See Crocker v. Winthrop Laboratories, 514 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. 1974); Keeton,
Products Liability-Drugs and Cosmetics, 25 VAND. L. Rnv. 131, 141 (1972).
48. See Delhi-Taylor Oil Corp. v. Henry, 416 S.W.2d 390 (Tex. 1967).
49. Keeton, Torts, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 23 Sw. L.J. 1, 4 (1969).
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serious dilemma has developed due to the high cost of, or in some instances,
the unavailability of, liability insurance for doctors and hospitals. As a
result, temporary measures were initiated during the last legislative session to
reduce the inordinately high cost of medical malpractice insurance.5 0 First,
in order to provide sufficient time for protracted research by the newly
created Study Commission, 1 insurance rates for providers of health care
were brought under the control of the State Board of Insurance.5 2 Next, a
Joint Underwriting Association composed of all liability insurers was created
to guarantee the availability of up to $300,000 in liability insurance to each
purveyor of health care.5 3 Finally, the statute of limitations applicable to
medical malpractice actions was amended to reduce the risk borne by the
insurers.54
The manner in which the statute of limitations was amended raises
questions as to its constitutional validity. The new statute of limitations
provides that "no claim against a person or hospital covered by a policy of
professional liability insurance covering a person licensed to practice medi-
cine or podiatry or certified to administer anesthesia in this state or a
hospital licensed under the Texas Hospital Licensing Law . . .may be
commenced unless the action is filed within two years of the breach [of
contract] or tort complained of . . . ,,55 The new statute apparently
abrogates the rule of Gaddis v. Smith, which involved a cause of action
predicated upon a doctor's negligence in leaving a surgical sponge inside his
patient. The Texas Supreme Court held that the statute of limitations began
to run when the patient learned or should have learned of the presence of
the foreign object, rather than from the time of the operation.5 6 Although
the "discovery rule" has had a substantial impact on insurance rates because
of the prolongation of time within which a claim can be brought, it is
patently unfair to deprive a person of a cause of action before he is able to
discern its existence. On the other hand, considerable difficulty results when
one attempts to reconstruct an incident that occurred ten years prior to the
time a claim is filed, and perhaps this provides a reasonable basis for the
statute. A further constitutional objection arises in light of the fact that the
statute applies only to doctors and hospitals covered by liability insurance. A
distinction between insureds and uninsureds for statute of limitations purposes
could conceivably constitute invidious discrimination.
50. TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21-49-3 (Supp. 1975-76).
51. Ch. 331, §§ 2, 3, [1975] Tex. Laws 867.
52. TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.82 (Supp. 1975-76).
53. Id. art. 21.49-3, § 3.
54. Id. art. 5.82, § 4.
55. id.
56. 417 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. 1967); see Keeton, Torts, Annual Survey of Texas Law,
22 Sw. L.J. 1, 8 (1968). See also Hays v. Hall, 488 S.W.2d 412 (Tex. 1972).
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